Are We Being Misled about Migration and Crime?

Across UK cities, slogans like “protect our community”, “save our women”, and “defend our children” are increasingly visible, fuelling the assumption that migrants make our streets less safe.

This anxiety has been weaponised in political arenas, with high-profile offences by individuals such as Hadush Kebatu in Essex and Sadeq Nikzad in Falkirk forming a core part of Reform UK’s messaging.

Consequently, public sentiment has shifted dramatically; a 2025 YouGov poll reveals that 71% of Britons now believe immigration levels have been too high over the last decade, up from just 44% in March 2022.

Yet, despite the algorithms and political rhetoric stoking these fears, the evidence linking migration to rising criminality is far less clear.

We delve into the statistics to uncover whether there is a link between migration and crime.

What are the Crime Rates?

The narrative that open borders equate to lawlessness is central to Nigel Farage’s ‘Britain is lawless’ campaign, which suggests criminality is spiralling out of control.

However, data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) contradicts this, showing that crime rates in England and Wales have fallen in most categories over the last decade.

A similar trend is evident in Scotland, where property and violent crimes have dropped by 37% since 2008. Specifically, recorded crime in Scotland plummeted from 1,007 incidents per 10,000 people in 2004-05 to 545 in 2024-25.

While the long-term trend is downward, there are nuanced rises; Scotland has seen increases in sexual crimes, shoplifting, and weapon possession since 2015, with a small overall uptick from a low of 529 crimes per 10,000 in 2021-22.

In England and Wales, homicides have reached their lowest level since recording practices began in 2003, and knife crime dropped by five per cent between 2023-24 and 2024-25, noting that 30% of these knife offences are concentrated in London.

The Data Problem

Determining the precise relationship between migration and law-breaking is hampered by significant gaps in the data.

Ben Brindle, a researcher from Oxford University’s Migration Observatory, notes, “We’ve got the conviction data and data on the prison population”, which offers some insight.

In 2024, foreign nationals accounted for 13% of convictions and 12% of the prison population in England and Wales.

These are figures that align closely with their 12% share of the general population. In Scotland, non-UK nationals make up only nine per cent of prisoners, despite comprising 10.2% of the population.

However, these figures may be skewed by data reliability issues, particularly regarding the 2024 Annual Population Survey, which likely underestimates the number of recent arrivals living in communal establishments like asylum hotels and student halls.

Furthermore, the government has not released age breakdowns for convictions, which is crucial because, as Brindle explains:

“Foreign nationals are more likely to be younger, and younger people are more likely to commit crimes.”

If researchers could adjust for age, foreign nationals would likely be underrepresented in the prison system, but the current data lacks the depth to confirm this definitively.

What does the Evidence Say?

When examining the issue through a wider lens, the link between migration and crime becomes even more tenuous.

A 2022 peer-reviewed study analysing 30 countries over 30 years found that “no statistical evidence exists to relate an increase in the number of immigrants to the rise of any kind of crime”.

Closer to home, a 2013 project in England and Wales did identify a possible causal link between asylum seekers and a rise in property crime, but importantly, it found property crime decreased in areas with more EU migrants.

The authors attributed this discrepancy to asylum seekers being barred from working, unlike their EU counterparts.

It is important to note that some studies do show correlations in specific contexts; for instance, a Swedish study found individuals from immigrant backgrounds were overrepresented in rape convictions.

However, Brindle points out that in the broader academic analysis, researchers “tend to find that there’s no relationship between the share of migrants in an area and violent crime rates”.

Looking Deeper into the Headlines

Media narratives often focus on nationality while ignoring the socio-economic factors that drive criminal behaviour.

Brindle explains: “We can see this data on nationality. But we don’t have the data on the other characteristics that are going to influence criminal behaviour.”

To form an accurate picture, analysis must account for age, sex, and socio-economic status rather than viewing nationality in a vacuum.

Brindle emphasises:

“Somebody’s nationality is not the only factor that’s going to affect the likelihood that they commit a crime.”

“It’s also going to depend on their age, their sex, their socio-economic status, and we haven’t got a lot of these things in data to be able to actually work out what is driving criminal behaviour”.

Since many asylum seekers are young men, a demographic statistically more likely to offend regardless of origin, raw data can be misleading without these essential adjustments.

The debate around migration and crime is often fought with loud slogans rather than quiet statistics.

While fears of a “lawless” Britain drive political campaigns and public anxiety, the available evidence does not support the idea of a migrant-driven crime wave.

Crime rates are generally falling, and when demographic factors like age are accounted for, the link between foreign nationals and criminality often weakens or disappears entirely.

However, until the government addresses the significant data gaps regarding age and demographics, the conversation will likely remain dominated by perception rather than fact.

As Brindle suggests, the key to moving forward is ensuring we have the statistics to inform us, rather than relying on rhetoric.